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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 173 vehicle when they have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime m;;t.y be found inside the car. 4 The Burger Court has· thus transformed a narrow and tightly drawn exception into a virtually limitless general rule. In so doing, the Court has demonstrated a growing preference for warrantless searches in public places. In Ross, the Justices abandoned precedent, for which the ink was hardly dry, leaving little more of the judicial preference for a warrant than a shibboleth to be incanted periodically while the warrant clause is systematically ignored.
The Ross decision sought to clarify an ambiguous area of the law by restating and expanding the automobile exemption. In fact the Court went further, holding that the scope of a search under the automobile exception "is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant." 5 This statement provides the rationale underlying the Burger Court's repeated approval of broad warrantless searches even absent the conditions which gave rise to the exception. Moreover, despite its new bright-line rule, the decision leaves significant questions unanswered <J.nd may also signal the gradual creation of an entirely new and broader public place-probable cause exception to the warrant clause. 6 The purpose of this Article is to examine the Ross decision and its implications for related fourth amendment areas. It will also discuss the automobile exception, the broad scope of warrantless searches, and the possible emergence of a public place-probable cause exception to the warrant requirement.
II. UNITED STATES V. Ross
The case arose when District of Columbia police received a telephone tip from a reliable informant that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics out of a parked vehicle. 7 The informant advised the officers that he had just observed Bandit complete a narcotics transaction and had been told by Bandit that additional narcotics 4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . 5 102S. Ct.at2172. 6 This approach was rejected by the Court as recently as 1977. "We do not agree that the Warrant Clause protects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales.'' United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7 (1976) . "[A] fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home." /d. at II (footnotes and citations omitted). "I think it somewhat 'unfortunate that the Government sought a reversal in this case primarily to vindicate an extreme view of the Fourth Amendment that would restrict the protection of the Warrant Clause to private dwellings and a few other 'high privacy' areas." /d. at 17 (Blackmun, J, dissenting).
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LEWIS R. KATZ [Vol. 74 were in the car's trunk. The informant described Bandit and the automobile.8 When the officers went to the scene, they observed a vehicle matching the informant's description. A computer check revealed that it was registered to Albert Ross, who fit the informant's description and was known to use the alias "Bandit." The officers saw the vehicle but no one matching Ross' description and they left the area to avoid alerting the suspect. 9 When they returned in five minutes, they saw the automobile being driven from its parking spot. The officers pulled alongside, confirmed that the driver matched the informant's description, stopped the car and ordered the driver from the vehicle. The officers searched Ross, discovered a bullet on the front seat of the automobile and then searched the interior compartment of the vehicle, finding a gun in the glove compartment. Ross was arrested and handcuffed. 10 The officers took Ross' car keys and opened the trunk. There, they discovered two containers: a closed, but unsealed, brown paper bag and a zippered red leather pouch. In the paper bag, the officers found several glassine envelopes containing white powder. The leather pouch was not disturbed. The paper bag was placed back in the trunk next to the zippered pouch and the vehicle vvas driven to police headquarters. 11 There, the car vvas subjected to a second search. The paper bag was removed and sent to the police laboratory, which later determined that the envelopes contained heroin. The zippered pouch was opened and found to contain $3,200. 12
The government charged Ross with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 13 Having denied his suppression motion, the trial judge then admitted both the heroin and the money into evidence, and Ross was convicted. 14 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard the case twice, once in panel and again en bane, 15 spotlighting the uncertainty surrounding the automobile container cases. On both occasions, the court attempted to fit the case into the framework the Supreme Court created in Arkansas v. Sanders, 16 where a majority held that the automobile exception is limited to the vehicle itself and does not extend to containers found in an automobile. The Court in Sanders approved a procedure by which a container discovered in a warrantless automobile 1983] WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 175 search could be seized for safekeeping by police, who would then petition the court for a search warrant. 17 The Sanders Court reaffirmed support for the automobile exception but reasoned that none of the proferred justifications for the exception applied to closed containers within a vehicle.
By the time Sanders was decided in 1979, application of the automobile exception had already outstripped its original justifications, forcing the Court to develop new rationales for the constant e_&pansion of the warrant exemption. 18 None of those rationales, however, warranted expansion of the exception beyond the yehicle to its contents, and in Sanders, the Court drew that constitutional line. Unfortunately, even this line provided inadequate guidance for future cases. The majority had indicated that not all containers were entitled to fourth amendment protection and suggested exclusion where the package fails to demonstrate an owner's expectation of privacy. 19 Clearly within this category were containers which are not closed and where the contents are open to "plain view;" similarly unprotected were containers whose contents are inferable from the outward packaging of the container. 20 But Justice Powell; the author of the Sanders majority opinion, implied that other containers fell outside the protection. 21 He predicted that it would be difficult to distinguish between containers which were entitled to the full protection of the warrant clause and those which were not. 22 Many lower courts interpreted Powell's oblique comment as presaging the development of a "worthy container" rule, 23 which Justice Powell alone 17 This was the procedure already approved for containers found in a public place. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, II (1977) . 18 Su, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (after arrest of defendant and seizure of car, warrantless search of car upheld; Chambas used as authority for the decision with'out any reference to exigent circumstances, mobility, or the impracticability of obtaining a warrant); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (search of exterior of automobile parked in public lot allowed since defendant's attorney knew police were interested in automobile); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of automobile at police station reasonable since a warrantless search would have been reasonable at scene of arrest); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (warrantless search of automobile towed after issuance of two parking violations upheld as related to standard police caretaking procedure); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search of car two and one-half hours after defendant was hospitalized and car towed to private lot upheld as incident to caretaking function of police A majority of the D.C. Circuit panel that first heard Ross followed Justice Powell's lead and applied a "worthy container" rule. The panel majority found a difference of constitutional magnitude between the leather pouch and paper bag uncovered in defendant's trunk and held that worthiness is to be determined by a container's likely contents. 25 Although the contents could not be examined in order to determine whether the container might be searched without a warrant, the court said the nature of the contents could be divined from the outward qualities of the container. 26 Judge Tamm, writing for the panel majority, reasoned that the protection of the rule is limited to containers which are likely repositories for intimate personal belongings; therefore the unsealed paper bag might be searched because it was not an appropriate repository for such possessions. 27 The panel ruled that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the paper bag once it was lawfully in the hands of the police because a paper bag is quite insubstantial, affording minimal protection against accidental and deliberate intrusions by the curious and dishonest. 28 On the other hand, Judge Tarnm distinguished the pouch as a form of luggage representing a "personal sanctuary"; the reasonable person would view it as an appropriate repository for intimate personal possessions, thereby manifesting a reasonable expectation of privacy and worthy of the full protection of the warrant clause. 29 Presumably, if the Supreme Court had adopted a "worthy container" rule, the line drawn at the paper bag by Judge Tamm, though attacked as "acute ethnocentric myopia," 30 was as sound (198 !) . "What one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." /d. at 426. Justice as one could find. Judge Tamm did not find it easy to defend the "worthy container" rule but apparently inferred from Justice Powell's opinion in Sanders that the Supreme Court intended to subscribe to such a rule, 31 A "worthy container" rule hardly provides a meaningful theoretical framework, let alone functional standards, for courts to distinguish that which is constitutionally protected from that which is not. Such a rule would significantly increase the unpredictability of fourth amendment litigation, where complaints of unpredictability already abound.
Moreover, the panel also was faced with the difficulty of determining in a vacuum the expectation of privacy in the container, without also considering the expectation of privacy in the place where the container is stored. While expectations ofprivacy are theoretically measured by the expectations of the reasonable person, that most fruitful avenue of inquiry was foreclosed from the panel's consideration. 32 A reasonable person would likely assume that a container placed in a locked automobile trunk, while by no means as secure as leaving it at home in a locked closet or for that matter in a bank safe, sufficiently manifests an expectation of privacy to be worthy of constitutional protection. But the structure of inquiry was governed by the automobile exception to the warrant clause. At least from 1970 until Ross, the exception rested largely on the theory .that one who reveals his presence in public by riding in an automobile sacrifices a privacy interest in the entzre vehicle, including separate locked compartments. 33 The Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Sanders 34 held that this loss of privacy did not carry beyond the vehicle itself, and that most closed containers were not subject to warrantless searches under the authority of the automobile excep-Stevens seems to take great satisfaction that Ross will not discriminate on the basis of wealth, 102 S. Ct. at 2171 & n.31. But Justice Marshall was not encouraged by such an equalizing result, since the distinction between the way rich and poor package their possessions is eliminated by the loss of protection to both. !d. at 2182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 31 [Vol. 74 tion. In reliance on Justice Powell's opinions in Sanders and Robbzizs, the panel majority in Ross drew constitutional distinctions based upon the size and substantiality of the containers' packaging. 35 The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, 36 rejected its panel majority's reading of Sanders and the "worthy container" rule. Instead, the en bane majority adopted the analysis proposed by Judge Bazelon, who had dissented from the panel's conclusion.37 Writing for the majority, Judge Ginsburg concluded that:
Sanders did not establish a "worthy con-tainer" rule encompassing bags of leather but not of paper. Rather, it appears to us that Sanders reaffirmed the Supreme Court's longstanding position regarding the centrality of the warrant requirement to Fourth Amendment administration: absent a "specifically established and well-delineated" _exception, a warrantless search is, per se impermissible. . . .
No specific, well-delineated exception called to our atte11tion permits the police to dispense with a warrant to open and search "unworthy" containers. Moreover, we believe that a rule under which the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgments about the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the warrantless opening of.a closed, opaque paper bag to the same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch.3B Three months later, a majority of the Supreme Court in Robbzizs v. California adhered to the position advanced in Sanders, and rejected extension of ~he automobile exception to a vehicle's contents. 39 Six members of the Robbzizs Court agreed that most closed containers found in a car are protected to the same extent as closed containers found elsewhere, ruling that the justifications which gave rise to the automobile exception-mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in avehicle-are inapplicable to the contents of the vehicle. 40 opaque packages found in the luggage compartment of the defendant's station wagon. 41 But the majority could agree only on its refusal to extend the automobile exception; there was no other majority position in Robbzizs . 42 A plurality of four, represented by Justice Stewart, rejected the proposition that the warrant clause only protected containers likely to hold personal effects and noted that the constitutional protection extends to people and their effects, "whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal.' " 43 According to Justice Stewart, the fourth amendment guarantee attaches because items are placed in closed, opaque containers.44 Justice Stewart also rejected the "worthy container" rule, thus pro-P?sing constitutional protection for all but the two categories specifically excluded by the Sanders Court-items that are in plain view or those whose packaging announces their contents. 45
The other two votes for reversal in Robbzns were cast by Justice Powell, who wrote a separate concurring opinion, 46 and Chief Justice Burger, who voted with the majority but concurred in neither of the written opinions. 47 Justice Powell confirmed that Judge Tamm had interpreted his Sanders opinion correctly by advocating a "worthy container" rule. He rejected both the plurality's bright-line rule extending fourth amendment protection to all but the specifically excluded containers 48 and the dissent's bright-line rule extending the automobile exception to all containers found in any lawfully stopped and searched vehicle. 49 At the same time, Justice Powell was attracted to the dissent's advocacy of an expanded automobile exception as a way of providing agreement for a majority of the Court on an issue that had provoked incessant litigation. 5° This attraction increased and ultimately led him to switch his position in Ross . 51
In Sanders, Chief Justice Burger had concurred with the majority but did not think it necessary in that case to decide whether the automo- bile exception applied to the contents of a vehicle. 52 His silent vote in Robbzm was evidence that he had resolved this question against expansion of the automobile exception. 5 3 His contradictory vote in Ross less than a year later was again unaccompanied by any separate statement explaining his reasoning or his apparent self-reversal. In Ross, the Chief Justice joined in the majority opinion, which was a restatement of the dissent against which he had voted in Robbzm . 54 The inability of the Robbzns majority to present a unified theory in support of its decision set the stage for the reconsideration of the issue the following term in Unzted States v. Ross. 55 The absence of a clear majority position was compounded by other factors. First, Justice Stewart, the author of the plurality position and one of the principal advocates of strict limitations upon exceptions to the ·warrant requirement, retired at the end of the term, days after delivering his opinions in Robbzns and its companion case, New York v. Belton . 56 Second, Justice Powell's "worthiness" evaluation was clearly unacceptable to the rest of the Court. Moreover, Powell himself had expressed growing discomfort with the uncertainty in this area, which ultimately led him to approve the dissenters' bright-line ruleY Finally 
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indicated in his Robbins dissent that these principles were inapplicable when considering automobiles. 59 Facilitated by one retirement and two vote changes, six Justices were thus able to coalesce around the views of Justice Stevens to produce a majority opinion in "this troubled area." 60 The Ross Court held that a warrantless search under the automobile exception, where police have legitimately stopped an automobile and have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed within it may be "as thorough as a magistrate could· authorize in a warrant 'particularly describing the place to be searched.' "6l
Justice Stevens reviewed the origins of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The exception was created in Carroll v. Unzted States 62 as a response to the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. The Court has repeatedly rejected an alternative Justice Harlan proposed after Carroll in Chambers v. Maroney , 63 that would have required police first to seize the vehicle and then obtain a_warrant before conducting a search. In Ross, Justice Stevens restated in a footnote the Court's reasoning for rejecting the Harlan approach; 64 he also sought to explain why the Court had approved warrantless searches where automobiles have already been seized, are safely in police custody, and where the security of the evidence is no longer at risk. The decision to expand the exception, he contended, was based on the "practicalities of the situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests." 65 According to Justice Stevens, the Court has refused to require the posting of a guard or the towing of the vehicle because the privacy interest of the occupants has already been intruded upon by the stopping. 66 Moreover, he suggested that such a rule would often leave the car's occupants stranded on the highway while the car was seized. 67 Justice Stevens stressed that the exception is only available where objective facts would justify issuance. of a warrant by a magistrate "and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers. "68
The automobile exception which the Burger Court inherited was limited and carefully drawn. It recognized that the mobility of a vehicle would create, in certain circumstances, an exigency which would allow police officers, who lawfully stopped a vehicle upon a highway, to conduct an immediate search without first obtaining judicial permission. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement, devised by Chief Justice Taft in Carroll, 69 recognized the existence of a'n emergency situation where police, having probable cause to believe that evidence would be found in a vehicle, would lose the opportunity to search for and seize the evidence if forced to delay the search while a warrant was sought and the automobile was driven away. The exception was limited only to those situations where the delay caused by recourse to a judge or magistrate created the potential of forever denying to police the opportunity to recover contraband or evidence of a crime. h was thus reasonable for police to enter and search the vehicle without ·prior judicial permission because the alternative actually would have frustrated legitimate law enforcement purposes. 70 There was no prior arrest in Carroll which would have immobilized the occupants of the vehicle and prevented thern fr-orn reiT1oving the car* 71 The actual mobility of the particular automobile constituted the exceptional circumstance which provided the excuse for bypassing the warrant process.
The Ross Court claimed that Chief Justice Taft's failure to consider a temporary seizure of the vehicle serves as the basis for a broader reading of the Carroll rule. 72 In both cases, however, the police clearly could have temporarily seized the car while they petitioned for a warrant. 73 The occupants of the vehicle, not then under arrest, would have been displaced arid inconvenienced, but their privacy interest in the vehicle, Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. dem<·d, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), where 13 out of 24 judges sitting en bane held that evidence is not to be suppressed under. the exclusionary rule when officers discover it in the course of actions that an~ taken in good faith (!nd in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized. Jd at 846-4 7; su also Mertens and Wasserstrom, 
Foreword· The Good Fazih Exception to the Exclusiona'J' Rule
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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 183 while interrupted, would not have been nullified by police acting without judicial authorization. The Court in Carroll never considered this possibility, and the Burger Court has rejected it. 74 T!Ie latter has been unwilling to categorize seizure of a vehicle as significantly less an intrusion upon the protected privacy interest, although the Court does consider temporary seizures in other contexts a preferable and lesser intrusion. 75 In Ross, Justice Stevens attributed great significance to the Carroll Court's failure to consider a temporary seizure as a substitute for the immediate search. That omission formed part of the basis for Justice Steven's broader rule and allowed him to abandon the "actual mobility" rationale for the exception.
At the time of the Carroll decision, the privacy rationale was largely undeveloped as the basis of fourth amendment protection. The Court had not yet focused upon varying privacy interests, nor upon the need to minimize sanctioned intrusions. Justice Stevens suggested that a "seizure pending warrant" rule would often leave motorists stranded on the highway while their automobile was removed for safekeeping. 76 This solicitude for stranded motorists is incredible, particularly when offered as a revisionist basis for the Carroll decision by a Supreme Court which extended the exception to cases where motorists are arrested or otherwise incapacitated and where it is not necessary to conduct an immediate search. 77 In none of the cases in which the Burger Court has extended the automobile exception is such solicitude appropriate; in all of those cases, the occupants of the vehicles were already in police custody and thus were unlikely to be inconvenienced by removal of their car pending a search warrant. 78 As Justice Harlan suggested in 1970,7 9 even if the case should arise where a motorist is terribly inconvenienced by recourse to the warrant procedure, he can waive a warrant and consent to a search.ao 74 Having reaffirmed the unassailability of the automobile exception, the Court began the task of reversing the holding in Robbzns by extending the exception to the contents of lawfully searched vehicles. 81 The Robbzns /Sanders standard dictated that courts consider the vehicle and its contents separately when determining the necessity for a warrant. In both cases, the Court concluded that the reasoning which underlies the warrantless search of a vehicle was inapplicable to its contents, and that no independent justification for bypassing a warrant could be fashioned. However in Ross, the Court rejected this framework. It was sufficient, according to Justice Stevens, that the search which turned up the container was itself exempted from the warrant requirement; no separate justification need be made for a warrantless search of the container. 82 Consequently, the scope of a warrantless search authorized by the automobile exception, Justice Stevens wrote, is as broad as a search conducted with a warrant. 83 Under this approach, the exception that allows the warrantless intrusion is equated with a warrant. It secures entry for the police officer and does not circumscribe the scope of the subsequent search. The only limitation on a search under the automobile exception, like the limitation of a search conducted pursuant t~ a warrant, is defined by the object of the search. The authorization to search extends to the entire automobile, as well as to any container within the automobile which may house the object that is sought. 84
Ill. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION AFTER Ross
The automobile exception stands now as a general exception to the warrant requirement. 85 During the years of the exception's uncontrolled growth, the high Court has failed to develop a rationale to justify the exception's current dimensions, nor has the Court explained its vast departure from established fourth amendment doctrine. As the scope of Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083 Ct. (1982 , where the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, held that "overreaching" is an overly expansive standard for application of the double jeopardy clause following a mistrial resulting from the defendant's own motion. Thus, where prosecutorial misconduct arises, counsel for th'e defense is faced with the choice between a ·possibly prejudiced jury or waiver of his client's right to a verdict from that jury. 8t the automobile exception has incrementally grown, fundamental fourth amendment principles have been cast aside in favor of transient rules. 86 In turn, these new rules have also given way with each new factual deviation. In the name of law enforcement expedience, the Court has endorsed each of these extensions, mocking basic fourth amendment jurisprudence to such a great degree that the current automobile exception, despite the Court's protests to the contrary, effectively undermines all applications of the warrant requirement. 87 The Supreme Court has said consistently that the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures mandates "that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable . . . . " 88 This statement reflects the view that a system that interposes a neutral judicial officer between citizens and police best protects the privacy interests of Americans. The Court's premise has been that in order to be effective, the fourth. amendment must operate b(':fore the intrusion is complete, when the protection is prophylactic rather than corrective. 89 Reasonableness is to be determined in. the first instance by compliance with the demands of the warrant clause.
This traditional analysis demands that the warrant requirement be excused only when the cost to society resulting from the delay is great and jeopardizes legitimate societal interests. For example; a warrantless search is permissible if the delay. may seriously jeopardize society's opportunity to conduct the search at all or if it may in any way endanger the safety of law enforcement officers. The burden rests upon the government to demonstrate that the intrusion fits within "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.90 In the past, the Supreme Court did not look upon the warrant requirement as a formality designed to be waived at the mere spectre of police inconvenience. In fact, in McDonald v. Unzted States , 91 the Court indicated that the state must show "some grave emergency" 92 before it may bypass the shield which the fourth amendment erects between a citizen and the police. Moreover, in McDonald, the Court said that police inconvenience does not constitute such an emergency. Those carefully drawn" to ensure that the exceptions do not become the gen-. era! rule and are 'justified by absolute necessity. " 93 As the Court has observed, the warrant requirement does not commit protection of privacy to the discretion of "zealous officers" who are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. " 94 The amendment does not seek to deny police opportunities to search for criminal evidence, but simply requires that a magistrate prescreen certain police activities to ensure that individual privacy is not unreasonably invaded. 95 Thus, the warrant process provides an objective determination of probable cause coupled with reasonable limitations on the scope of intrusions, rather than placing total reliance for the protection of privacy on an after-the-fact suppression process which is "too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment. " 96 From 1925 until 1970, the automobile exception ~as confined to searching vehicles whose occupants were not under arrest. There was no pressure for its expansion because most automobile searches followed arrests, and the scope of searches incident to arrest was then virtually limitless; 97 Thus the automobile exception was rarely invoked. How- In colonial times warrantless searches, except for those incident to arrest, were unknown and unauthorized under English law. The warrant requirement suited the temper of the colonists whose privacy the colonial authorities had systematically invaded. By imposing an independent judiciary between law enforcement officers and the people and requiring warrants with adequate particularization supported by probable cause, the framers conformed the rules to their vision of a society in which individual rights would be protected. /d. 94 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 187 ever, when the Supreme Court reviewed the scope of searches incident to arrest in Chime! v. Califomza , 98 it reduced their range to the area within the reaching or grabbing distance of the arrestee. Once the driver of a vehicle was arrested and removed from the automobile, he was no longer within reaching distance of objects within the vehicle. 99 The automobile exception reemerged as a device to allow police to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles following an arrest, assuming there is independent probable cause to conduct a search.
One year after the end of the Warren era, the Court abandoned mobility as the sine qua non for warrantless searches of vehicles, eliminating that factor which had allowed the Carroll Court to categorize as exceptional the circumstances which necessitated an immediate search in that case. in Chambers v. Maroney, 100 the vehicle was stopped and its occupants arrested. Just one year earlier, a search of the vehicle would have been upheld as incident to the arrest of the car's occupants. With that channel now closed by the standard imposed in Chzmel, the Court looked to the automobile exception for justification of the warrantless search. The only problem was that the critical test relied upon by the Carroll Court-that an immediate search was necessary to prevent losing the opportunity-would not have authorized the warrantless intrusion in Chambers. After groping for a rationale, the Court concluded that a car on the highway, though under police control, is always mobile. 101 The Chambers rationale, however, promised still broader application of defendant was onder arrest btfore the search took place and, in deciding the case, the Court used both the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest rationale to justify the search. 305 U.S. at 255. 98 395 u.s. 752 (1969) . 99 Nevertheless, some courts continued to use search incident to arrest as a rationale for upholding warrantless searches of an automobile after the arrestee was out of the car and in police custody. For example, the New York courts, prior to the decision in Bellon, followed such a course. Su, t:.g., People Professor LaFave has cataloged the reluctance of some courts to apply the Chimd standards in his treatise. See W. LAFAVE, supra .note 71, at 413-19, 499-506.
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the Carroll exception to cars in poli~e custody even after they are removed from the highway.
The result of the Court's holding in Chambers was to legitimize a warrantless search where there was no conceivable need for police to proceed without first obtaining a warrant. When the Court approved warrantless searches of automobiles in pol.ice custody, securely immobilized and removed to the police station, solely for the sake of police convenience, it strained theoretical justifications for the automobile exception.
The Court could have achieved the same result in Chambers with a limited rule permitting warrantless searches of vehicles stopped on the highway when there is probable cause to conduct a search. In addition, such a rule could have countenanced searches conducted away from the highway where a search at the scene is demonstrably unsafe. 102 Even this rule, however, would have marked a significant devi~tion from Carroll. Instead, the Chambers Court fashioned a rule to allow police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene or later at the police station in the absence of both a warrant and exigent circumstances.103· The mobility of the automobile lost ali significance when the Court adopted a general exception applicable even to those vehicles "in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were . . . non-existent." 104
The Court ~ubstituted a rationale based upon the diminished expectation of privacy in the automobile. 105 It reasoned that the privacy expectation of a person who reveals himself to public view by occupying an automobile is necessarily reduced. In addition, the Court considered the fact that a vehicle is primarily used for transportation rather than as a repository for personal effects, and that government extensively regulates its use. 106 The Court has never explained convincingly how this reasoning supports searc~es of separate locked compartments or of objects which are not in plain view and are stored in the recesses of a vehicle. Moreover, it completely contradicts the principle recognized by the 102 In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n. 10, the Court recognized that police safety deserved special consideration:
It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occupants in the car were arrested in ~ dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers, and it would serve the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the vehicle and the keys together at the station house. 103 
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Court that one demonstrates an expectation of privacy by exerting caution and removing conduct and effects from public scrutiny. 107 The majority in Ross peremptorily abandoned the privacy rationale as the theoretical linchpin of the expanded automobile exception. Instead, Justice Stevens returned to Carroll and argued that the exception has always rested upon the impracticability of requiring a warrant for the search of automobiles. 108 The Court cited language in the Carroll opinion purportedly demonstrating that impracticability is the basis of the exception and that, to goods in transport, the exception is as old as the fourth amendment itself. 109 The Carroll language pertaining to impracticability, however, does not support a general rule allowing warrantless searches when an immediate search is unnecessary and a warrant could be practicably obtained. Chief Justice Taft's discussion of practicability was inextricably linked to his discussion of mobility and the search for objects which could be "put out of reach of a search warrant. " 110 He was particularly concerned with the search in .which "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. " 111 The Taft opinion was limited to situations where the opportunity to seize evidence would be thwarted if a warrantless search could not be conducted.
Under the vague rubric of"impracticability," 112 the Court has thus created a general exemption, despite the overwhelming number of situations in which the warrant requirement imposes no great burden upon police and frustrates no legitimate law enforcement objective. The automobile exception repudiates a central teaching of the fourth amendment that police inconvenience does not justify bypassing the constitutional warrant requirement. 113 Moreover, the Court has not even limited the exemption to situations where police could demonstrate that the warrant requirement posed f1 serious inconvenience. Instead, the Court has created a blanket exemption covering, as well, those cases where recourse to a warrant imposes no inconvenience other than that intended under the fourth amendment. Finally, and perhaps most trag-
ically, the Court made no effort to demonstrate that requiring a warrant prior to the search of either an immobilized vehicle or the containers found within the vehicle frustrates legitimate law enforcement objectives. Rather, the Court has simply devised a general rule which diminishes constitutional protection and enhances unchecked police discretion.
Ross' extension of the automobile exception to containers found in a lawfully searched vehicle proved a more difficult hurdle. That barrier existed because the Court's rationale for the automobile exception does not remotely apply to closed, opaque containers discovered in an automobile. Containers seized outside automobiles may be held but may not be searched until judicial authorization is obtained. Containers hidden in a vehicle would rea·sonably fall" within the rationale of this rule and not be subject to an exception resting upon a dimin.ished expectation of privacy in vehides. 114 Moreover, the inconvenience justification associated with towing and securing a vehicle does not extend to a package found in the car. There is simply no greater inconvenience involved in transporting and securing a container seized from an automobile than one found anywhere else.
Justice Stevens, in Ross, did not attempt to construct an independent justification for the search of containers found in an automobile. Instead, the Court held that an officer who has probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile may, as a matter of course, search the entire vehicle and any container found within the vehicle that may house the sought-after object. 11 " Thus, the search of containers flows automatically from the automobile exception. This approach will, in the long run, be more pervasively destructive of the warrant requirement than any strained necessity argument would have been. 116 It equates the scope of a warrantless search, at least one accompanied by probable cause, to a search undertaken with a warrant. It extends the scope of such searches beyond what was necessary to fulfill the societal objectives which gave rise to the exemption from the warrant requirement.
According to Justice Stevens, the Carroll rationale supports the expansive view of the scope of warrantless searches. Once again, however, the Carroll opinion never focused on this issue. 117 There, the Court. upheld the admissibility of contraband which was found only after the li-quor agents "opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery." 118 From this, Justice Stevens assumed that the Court would have also authorized a warrantless search if the agents had then encountered closed containers under or within the upliolstery. 119 The significant change in the law engineered in Ross rests only on this unsupported assumption.
Having assumed that the Carroll exception applies to all vehicles and their contents, Justice Stevens reintroduced the privacy formula to fortify his conclusion. Just as an individual's interest in the privacy of his home must give way to a ·magistrate's warrant, "an individual's ex.pectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband."120 Then Justice Stevens quite correctly concluded that the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment are no less than those in a movable container. However, the flaw in the argument is that the Carroll Court did not exempt all automobiles from the warrant requirement. By starting with the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles, the Burger Court expanded the Carroll exception to all vehicles. But the Court has never successfully explained how that rationale: absent a necessity to conduct a warrantless search, applied to the separate, locked compartments of immobilized vehicles. Now Justice Stevens has taken the exception full circle. He discarded the privacy rationale as the basis for the exception and used Carroll to support a broad general exemption never anticipated by the Carroll Court. He then concluded that the privacy interest presents no obstacle to extending the exception to closed containers.
Treating the contents of a vehicle differently from the vehicle itself was certainly anomalous. The confusion, however, was not caused by Sanders or Robbins, which correctly applied traditional fourth amendment doctrines. The unsupported and result-oriented growth of the automobile exception created the confusion and left no analytical structure with which to work out future cases. The majority opinion in Ross ends the confusion in the area of automobile searches and attempts to create a new analytical framework in which to resolve these questions, but it is a framework that requires a revisionist reading of the automobile cases that preceded it. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the parameters which the Court had developed for the consideration of warrantless searches. Not only has the Court finally succeeded in making the word "automobile" "a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment 
IV. THE ScoPE oF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AFTER Ross
Aside from its anomalous treatment of automobile searches, Ross promises to affect other fourth amendment issues. By merging the automobile and its contents and abandoning the effort to establish an independent exemption for searching receptacles contained in the vehicle, the Supreme Court was forced to offer a new analysis of the scope of warrantless searches generally and of automobile searches in particular.
For more than a quarter of a century, warrantless intrusions were treated as extraordinary and subject to strict control. 122 . That control was exercised over the decision to make the initial intrusion as well as over the scope of that intrusion. 1 23 By requiring the law enforcement authority to justify the scope of the warrantless search as well as over the initial intrusion, the Court emphasized the extraordinary nature of these exceptions. 124 Relieving tl1e government from justifying the scope of its search strips the warrant requirement of half its protection. The abuses of power which led to the enactment of the fourth amendment involved not only entry by the Crown's representatives but the ransacking that took place once entry had been accomplished. 125 Prior to Ross, warrantless searches were not considered an equally acceptable and broad alternative to searches with warrants. Such intrusions were sanctioned only when the costs of obtaining a warrant outweighed the 125 An indication of the abuse which concerned the colonists was set forth in a declaration by a committee authorized by a town meeting in Boston to compile a list of "Infringements and Violations of Rights" in 1772:
Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares &c for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant instances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other Sea Port towns. By this we are cut off from that domestick securiiy which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the cloak of a general warrant [sic] break thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack mens houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves commit the most horred murders. B. SCHWARTZ, The Bi!! '!fRights: A Docummla1)' His/Of) ' 206 (1971) ; sec also Grano, supra note 93, at 618-20.
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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 193 benefits attributable to the warrant process. 126 The possible permanent loss of evidence while a warrant is sought creates the type of necessity which will justify a warrantless search. Once the possibility of loss of the evidence is neutnilized, the necessity evaporates as should the authority to proceed further without judicial authorization. 127 This analysis led to the result· in Robbzns . 128 The plurality concluded that the reasons offered in support of the automobile exception were inapplicable to the vehicle's contents and found no independent justification for a warrantless search of the packages. 129 After the officers in Robbz'ns discovered and exercised control over the two packages, there could be no argument that it was necessary to conduct an immediate search. Moreover, an individual who has placed his effects in sealed, opaque containers has demonstrated an expectation of privacy meriting constitutional protection. There was no threat that the evidence would be lost, nor was it argued that it was impracticable to transport and safeguard the packages. As a general rule, there is a greater assurance that the entire contents of such packages will end up in the police property room if the packages remain unopened until they are safely at the police station and then opened in accordance with a court directive. The Robbz'ns Court simply concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing a warrant.
But in Unzted States v. Ross , 130 the Supreme Court devised a new norm. While Justice Stewart, a year earlier in Robbz'ns, had required a showing of necessity for each step of the warrantless intrusion, 131 Justice Stevens for the Ross majority has chosen instead an approach which guarantees minimal judicial control over the scope of warrantless searches. The intrusion itself remains subject to the traditional inquiry and must fit within a "specifically established and well-delineated" exception,132 although the rigor of that inquiry will likely diminish now that the automobile exception is firmly anchored in nothing more than the "impracticability" of obtaining a warrant. Under the Ross doctrine, however, no link remains between the scope of the warrantless search and the exceptional nature of the warrantless intrusion. Once an exception permits the initial intrusion, the scope of the search is no more limited than a search with a warrant. 133 The scope of the search has no relationship to the objectives which justified the initial intrusion, and 126 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979 extends to any container which could house the object, whether or not there is any justification for searching the container without prior judicial approval. Examination of the facts in Ross fails to disclose any cost to society had police merely seized the containers pending judicial authorization to search them. There was no risk that the evidence would have been lost to the police had the paper bag and zippered pouch remained closed until a warrant was issued. 134 The police were entitled to seize and protect the two containers. Because the defendant was already in custody, there would be no question of inconveniencing him while police waited for the warrant. Moreover, since the zippered pouch was not searched until it was removed to the police station, nothing was gained by bypassing the warrant. 135 In short, abandonment of the traditional analysis in. favor of this expansive rule accomplishes nothing in Ross and similar cases to promote effective law enforcement. The rule alleviates the burdens associated with police having to obtain a warrant. But Ross involved no greater burden and inconvenience than normally is involved in obtaining a warrant; indeed, it is precisely the type of burden and inconvenience that the fourth amendment intends. Instead, that burden has been alleviated without any suggestion that the corresponding diminution in constitutional protection will promote a significant social interest. The substitution for the traditional analysis of a broad new rule can be viewed as evidence of the diminished importance accorded by this Court to the warrant process. The Court recognizes little inherent value in the prior determination of a judge or magistrate when it dictates that the warrant process must give way to mere inconvenience and defines the scope of warrantless searches to be the same as those conducted with a warrant. 136 Two other decisions within the twelve months prior to Ross also involved broad definitions of the scope of warrantless searches. Both cases, Washington v. Chrisman 137 and lvew York v. Belton, 138 involved of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." !d. 1 3 4 Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent that "the police succeeded in transporting the bag to the station without inadvertently. spilling its contents." 102 S. Ct 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 195 searches incident to arrest. That exception requires only that police officers have probable cause to believe that an arrestee had committed a crime. While neither of these decisions announced a rule comparable in scope to Ross, they are part of a similar pattern: It is far easier to understand Belton and Chrzsman after the Ross opinion because all three uphold a broader search than the reasons supporting the exception to the warrant requirement would justify.
In New York v. Belton, 139 a majority of the Court extended the scope of a search incident to arrest to the interior compartment of a vehicle and all containers found therein, following the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle. The Court severed the scope of incidental searches of a vehicle from the reasons for excusing the warrant requirement following an arrest. Warrantless searchesincident to arrest are permitted to protect the police officer and to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence.140 Once it is assured that the arrestee cannot reach a weapon to threaten the officer's safety or gain access to evidence, those reasons disappear. Any further intrusion does not ·protect the officer or the evidence but serves the singular purpose of searching for evidence.
Since Chzinel v. Galifomza, L 41 searches incident to arrest were confined to the area within the control of the arrestee. The genius of the "control" test is that it imposes a limitation upon the scope of incidental searches perfectly consistent with legitimate law enforcement needs without unduly sacrificing fourth amendment protection. Belton disregarded the principle that warrantless intrusions are extraordinary; in so doing, it implicitly foreshadowed the rule in Ross that an exception to the warrant requirement permits a virtually unlimited search.
Waiver of the warrant requirement in Belton, as in Ross, did not promote essential law enforcement interests. Neither police possession of the evidence nor the opportunity to search would have been jeopardized if a warrant had been sought. 142 Further, the searches in Belton and Ross did not promote the policy reasons underlying the exceptions which authorized search without a warrant. Neither the officer nor the evidence in Belton was endangered by the arrestees at the time the search was conducted; similarly, the search in Ross was not justified by the policies underlying the automobile exception. In both cases, once the receptacles
were under exclusive police control, law enforcement objectives would not have been thwarted by recourse to a warrant. The result is a diminution of protection of fourth amendment interests without cognizable benefit. .
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Belton majority's analysis of the broad scope of searches incident to arrest. He disagreed because any exception to the warrant requirement, under his analysis, supplants only the warrant require~ent and. hot the other prong of the fourth amendment test. requiring the existence of probable cause to search. 143 Search incident to arrest, the exception relied upon in Belton, traditionally does not require probable cause to believe that evidence will be found. Despite their distinctive purposes, however, the Court treats the scope of the exceptions in an identical fashion. 144 A similar theory upheld the intrusion in Washzizgto_n v. Chrzsman . 145 There, a state university police officer stopped the defendant's roommate who appeared to be under the age of twenty-one and carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. 146 The officer accompanied the student to his dormitory room to retrieve identification. 147 The student entered the room while the officer remained in the open doorway where he could observe the student and the defendant, who was in the room when they arrived. 148 He observed the defendant, who appeared nervous at the sight of the officer, place a small box in a medicine cabinet. The officer also observed a small pipe and seeds, which he believed to be marijuana, on a desk within the room. Then the officer completed entry into the room and examined the pipe and seeds, confirming that the seeds were marijuana and observing that the pipe smelled of marijuana. 149 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, a majority held that a police officer has the right to remain literally at an arrestee's elbow and that it is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment for the officer to monitor, "as his judgment dictates," the movement of an arrested person. 150 The police officer did not testify that he entered, and examined the marijuana, because of fear that the original arrestee or the defendant could 143 453 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court majority was unconcerned with the total absence of a nexus between the reason for the additional intrusion and the underlying reasons that allow a warrantless search incident to arrest. The majority focused exclusively on the fact that the officer could have entered the room initially with the arrestee; it ignored the principle that the need for a search must be demonstrated at the moment the search takes place, regardless of what could have been done moments earlier. The Court held that the officer had not abandoned his right to be in the room whenever he deemed it essential, 153 although his determination that it was essential was entirely unrelated to the reasons which originally gave him legal access to the room and was not based upon a subsequently arising exigency.
Ross, Belton and Chrisman constitute a watershed for the fourth amendment. The course that the Court has undertaken became clear only in Ross where Justice Stevens presented the bright-line rule defining the scope of searches under the automobile exception. Justice Stevens' rationale for that nile is consistent with the Belton and Chrzsman decisions, despite his disagreement with the rule in Belton. All three mark a retreat from the principles set forth in Chzmel v. California; which required a close link· between the scope of warrantless searches and the underlying justification for the warrantless intrusion. Although the Court in Belton indicated continued support for the Chzmel doctrine, it eviscerated the doctrine when the scene of the arrest is a vehicle. Chrzsman in turn belies the suggestion that Chzmel principles would be eroded only in the context of automobile searc!J.es.
A majority of today's Court concurs in supporting the broadest scope for warrantless searches, which it claims is based at least in part upon its "realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests." 154 This change is also based, again in part, upon the view that the importance accorded the fourth amendment by the Warren Court frustrates valid law enforcement interests. 155 It is uncertain whether this majority will prove 151 /d. at 819 (White, J., dissenting). !52 /d. at 815, 819 (White, J., dissenting). We do not have a free society if a citizen is put to the choice, to cite but three examples, of, one, foregoing use of the phone or having the police record all the numbers he dials, or, two, foregoing use of the postal service or having the police collect the names and addresses of a!l his correspondents, or, three, foregoing use of banks or providing the police with access to an enormous quantity of highly personal data. We are talking about unrestrained access to data. A third line of cases involves the broad interpretation of the scope of warrantless searches, the subject of this Article. 156 If the Court were to follow the Belton lead and reverse Chadwick and Sanders, eliminating the applicability of the Chzinel-cohtrol test as a limitation upon the scope of searches incident to arrests in public places, the question undoubtedly would arise whether C!uind should even be retained as a limitation upon searches incident to arrests that take place in homes. Justice Blackmun, who most consistently has argued against the applicability of the Chzind standard to public arrests, has specifically indicated that different concerns apply when the arrest takes place in a home. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 20 n.l (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is also unlikely that Chrisman would serve as the basis for overruling Cluinel, as the majority never seemed able to get beyond the point that the arresting officer had the right to be inside the room at the elbow of the arrestee, rather than serving as the basis fo1 a wide-1anging sea:rch once inside room or home. Moreover, the decisions in Pa)'ton, 445 U.S. at 573, and Steagald, 451 U.S. at 204, clearly evidence this Court's intent to treat invasions of homes far differently from intrusions that occur in public places.
Some exception may be taken to the use of Belton here as the basis for extension of the scope of searches incident to arrests that occur in public. Although search incident to arrest provided the theory on which the majority allowed a search of the interior compartment of the vehicle and all containers .found in that compartment, the Belton majority was overwhelmed by the fact that the site of the search was an automobile, a factor of great importance for this Court. At least one commentator has suggested that the Court may dispense with the Belton bright-line rule now that Robbins has been overruled, and a search of the entire car and all containers is permissible under the automobile exception. See Kamisar, supra note 85.
On the other hand, this author does not see the Court letting go of Belton, even though Justice Stevens would like to see that decision reversed, because Belton and Ross serve law enforcement interests differently and the Court is unlikely to deny police the authority to conduct automobile searches permissible under Bdton but impermissible under Ross where probable cause would not support a search of the vehicle.
Jtj4RRANTLESS SEARCHES 199 v. A PUBLIC PLACE-PROBABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION Among Justice Marshall's arguments in his Ross dissent is the contention that the decision "takes a first step toward an unprecedented 'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement. " 157 At the outset it is imperative to note that Justice Stevens did not advocate such an exception; in fact he took great pains in Ross to fit the result within a "well-established" exception. 158 Moreover, when given the opportunity to approve the probable cause exception in Unz.ted States v. ChadwzCk, 159 the Court unanimously rejected it. 16° Finally, nothing in Ross makes inexorable the development of such an exception. Nevertheless, various aspects of the reasoning in Ross lend credence to Justice Marshall's complaint.
The facile manner in which the majority expanded the automobile exception indicates that the exception, which is "well-established" because it was formally recognized in 1925, 161 provided a handy tool to reach the desired result rather than an analytical framework which dictated that result. The Court's difficulty in agreeing upon a rationale for the automobile exception evokes suspicion that its growth may not be completed. The Court was evidently self-conscious about the seeming anomaly between its treatment of the hidden recesses of a vehicle and containers found in the same automobile. The Ross concurring opinions herald the decision as an end to the confusion. 162 But as the Court addresses subsequent fourth amendment cases, the same confusion will arise concerning packages found in a vehicle and those seized elsewhere in public. At that time, a Court might elect to end the confusion by finding within Ross the foundation for a public place-probable cause exception. 163 The public place-probable cause exception originally surfaced in Chadwick with a search that fell between the fine lines separating the automobile exception and searches incident to arrest. 164 Railroad personnel in San Diego first became suspicious when they noticed two men, [Vol. 74 who matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers, load an unusually heavy footlocker onto a Boston-bound train. 165 The railroad officials notified federal authorities after they observed talcum powder, a sub-stance often used to mask the odor of marijuana and hashish, leaking from the trunk. A description of the two defendants and the footlocker was radioed to federal agents in Boston, who, along with a police dog trained to detect marijuana, met the train at its destination. 166 After the defendants reclai.med the-footlocker and while they were sitting on it, the police dog was released near the footlocker. Without triggering the defendants' attention, the dog acted in a manner to suggest to the agents that the footlocker contained a controlled substance. Thereafter, the two defendants and .a porter moved the footlocker outside where the three lifted it and placed it into the trunk of a waiting confederate's car. 167 The agents moved in and arrested the two travelers and their confederate while the trunk Of the car was still open and before the car had been started. They also seized the footlocker and found the keys to the footlocker on one of the defendarits. 168 The defendants and footlocker were removed to the federal building where, an hour and a half later, with neither a warrant nor the defendant's consent, the footlocker was opened, revealing a large quantity of marijuana. 169 The government offered as justification for the warrantless search the authority recognized under. both. the automobile exception and search incident to arrest. 170 Recognizing that the facts of their case did not squarely lie under either alternative, the government suggested instead that a warrant is necessary only for intrusions which implicate the historically essential purpose.s of the fourth amendment. 171 This theory would confine the warrant requirement to the core subjects of fourth amendment protection: homes, offices and private communications. Consequently, the reasonableness of a search of personal effects seized outside of the home would turn only on the existence of probable cause to support the search. 172 In order to consider this position, however, the Court was forced to reexamine its adherence to the principle "that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain judicial approval of searches and seizures . . . . " 173 The 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 201 upon its stated preference for a warrant and the Chief Justice's majority opinion dismissed the broad proposition, citing to the language of the amendment as well as its history. The Court acknowledged the "strong historical connection" 174 between the warrant clause and the initial clause of the amendment which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of effects as well as persons, houses and papers. It further noted the absence of evidence that the framers had intended to exclude from the protectipn all searches conducted outside the home. The warrant clause itself makes no distinction between-searches of private homes and other searches. In Chadwzdc, 175 the Court held that law enforcement officers, having probable cause to believe that the suspect footlocker contained a controlled substance, could legitimately seize and safeguard the container without a warrant, but could not search the container until a warrant was obtained. Thus, the Court minimized the warrantless intrusion without compromising legitima.te law enforcement objectives. 176 In Arlcansas v. Sanders, 177 the Court extended its Chadwick holding to a suitcase seized from a taxicab. The police stopped the taxicab in which the defendant was riding, although they had had sufficient probable cause to seize the suitcase prior to the cab's departure from the airport terminal. 178 With a broad stroke, the Court rejected an approach which distinguished between searching luggage in a vehicle where there is probable cause to search the entire vehicle and a search in which probable cause focused upon the container prior to its being placed in the automobile. The Court held that "the warrant requirement . . . applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations." 179 174 433 U.S. at 8. 175 !d. at I. 176 Prior decisions of the Court illustrate the understanding that the warrant clause was not intended to have the narrow limits the government suggested. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at II & n.6. Even the dissenters in Chadwick labeled the government's argument "an extreme view of the Fourth Amendment," id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), but would have upheld the search as incident to arrest; they advocated an alternative rule which would permit the warrantless search of "any movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place." !d. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although Justice Blackmun labeled the government's position as extreme, in relation to his own proposal, the exception the government offered was extreme only in that it would recognize and require creation of a new exception. On the other hand, while Justice Blackmun's sofution fits within an established exception-incident to arrest-it would eliminate not only the warrant requirement but the probable cause requirement, as well, antecedent to a search for evidence. It would also extend the warrant exemption fashioned later in Bdton to include as incident to arrest a search of the trunk of the vehicle and all property found in the trunk.
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As a result of Ross, the broad proposition stated in Sanders no longer applies; however, Justice Stevens explicitly affirmed support for thenarrow holding in Sanders though he rejected its reasoning. 18° Consequently, the propositions of Sanders and Ross together hold that the warrant requirement does not apply to containers taken from automobiles unless there is probable cause to search the container before it is placed in the automobile.
In the earlier cases ·arChadivzck, Sanders and Robbzns the Court focused upon the privacy interest in the container to be searched. Justice Powell argued that the size, construction and effort at sealing of certain containers entitled them to greater fourth amendment protection than others and that a warrant must be obtained before these containers are searched. 181 The remainder of the Court refused to allow the outcome to turn on the worthiness or unworthiness of a particular container. 182 In Robbzns, Justice Stewart maintained that once an object is placed in a closed, opaque container it is fully protected by the fourth amendment, 183 and Justice Stevens did not disagree with this aspect of the Robbzns decision.l8 4 The Ross Court shifted the focus of the inquiry from the particular object searched to the place searched. 185 The Court pointed to the diminished expectation of privacy of one whose home is searched under a warrant. As a result of this diminished expectation, any receptacle that may contain the searched-for items may be opened without a separate analysis of the privacy interest in the container. In Ross, the Court held that the search which is justified by a warrant, as well as the search which is justified un,der the automobile exception, destroys any privacy interest in the place to be searched. 186 Consequently, any container which falls within the warrant or the automobile exception may be opened and searched.
The impact of the Ross rule becomes apparent with its application to related fourth amendment issues. Situations which appear logically indistinguishable take on varying fourth amendment significance. Consider the problem arising after Ross when police receive a tip from a reliable, confidential informant 187 that he just returned from a house where he purchased narcotics from a supplier identified as Bandit, whose full ciescription and address are provided by the informant. 
1983]
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 203
informant also tells police that Bandit advised him that he would be leaving the area within the hour because it was getting "too hot," taking with him his remaining, large quantity of narcotics. 188 Whether police need a warrant to search for those narcotics when they apprehend Bandit may depend upon relatively insignificant factors. If police arrive and apprehend Bandit on the street, carrying a footlocker, after he has left his house, Chadwz"clc dictates that the officers may seize the footlocker but that they must· obtain a warrant before they may search it. 189 A different result obtains if Bandit is apprehended just as he drives out of his driveway onto the street. Since the police have probable cause to believe that he is transporting narcotics in the car, they may conduct a warrantless sea~ch of the vehicle, and Ross would permit the police to open and search the footlocker which they will find stored in the trunk of the automobile. 190 Obviously, the difference in results occurs because, in one case, the footlocker was found in an automobile and, in the other, it was not; automobiles are, by the Court's definition, different and subject to one of the "'few,' 'specifically established,' and 'well-delineated' " exceptions. 1 9 1 A third possibility could arise if the informant advises the officers that Bandit will transport the narcotics in a footlocker, and the footlocker is seized by the officers when they search the vehicle that he is driving. Under the .Ross endorsement of the holding in Sanders, if probable cause focused specifically on the footlocker prior to its placement in the vehicle, a warrant remains a prerequisite to the search of the container. 192 If the court intends, as it said it did, to preserve the Sanders holding, the footlocker in this example would be comparable to one seized on the street, and treated differently from Ross, even though it was actually seized from a moving car which was lawfully stopped and searched. However, if the police did not observe Bandit place the footlocker in the automobile, or if the informant neither saw it placed in the vehicle nor advised police that Bandit would leave by car, the reasoning in Ross may dictate a different result. It is possible that the Court will confine Sanders to those situations where the police had probable cause and an opportunity to seize the container before it was placed in the vehicle and waited only in order to exploit the automobile exception. If this twopronged test were read into Sanders, the Court would uphold the search LE"fVIS R. KATZ [Vol. 74 in this third hypothetical since the police did not have the opportunity to seize the footlocker before it was placed in the trunk of the automobile.
The facial absurdities of the results in these cases will create within the Court the same internal pressure for a sense of order that led it to the decision in Ross. After all, the law after the decision in Robbz"ns distinguishing a vehicle from its contents was clear enough. The only question remaining at that time was whether the protection applied to all opaque containers. The rule following the decision in Ross distinguishing contain~rs found in a vehicle from those seized in other public places is as clear. The remaining questions will require the Court to draw a line between containers placed in a vehicle after probable cause has focused on the package and those containers found in a vehicle where the probable cause focused upon the automobile and not upon the particular package. The gray areas between the two rules are ·bound to create difficulty. ·
As the Court enters the gray areas, the warrant requirement will hang in the balance. Least attractive to the Burger Court is an approach that would require reconsideration of the automobile exception itself. Such an examination should result inevitably in restoration of the limited Carroll exception which restricted waiver of a warrant to those few and unique situations where the mobility of the vehicle creates an actual necessity for immediate search. 193 Such an approach would reverse the Court's clear trend toward minimizing the necessity for a warrant to conduct searches in public areas. It would also require the Court to acknowledge that the rationales offered in support of the automobile exception in the line of cases from Chambers to Ross were fashioned of whole cloth.
A second approach would expand the scope of warrantless searches by applying the principles of search incident to arrest and deemphasize the dependence upon the automobile exception as the basis for an exemption. Support for this alternative was advanced by the dissenters in Chadwzdc, where Justice Blackmun suggested "that a warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place." 194 The dissent acknowledged that the fact of arrest does not necessarily obviate the privacy interest of the arrestee in the objects in his possession at the time of the arrest. It also conceded that impoundment pending issuance of a search warrant protects the privacy interest remaining in those objects. But Justice Blackmun offered several reasons why a search warrant is irrele- 
